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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK H. FULLMER, 
DAVID H. FULLMER and 
WILLARD L. FULLMER, /d/ba 
FULLMER BROTHERS, 
a Partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
PACIFIC INDEMNITY 
COMP ANY, a California 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
FRED A. MORETON & COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
\ 
\ 
Case 
No.10839 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THIS COURT: 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The single issue before the Court is whether the de-
fendant (Appellant), Pacific Indemnity Company, under 
the terms of its insurance policy No. LAC-120924 (Com-
1 
prehensive Liability Policy) (R. 6-17) has a duty to de-
fend its insured, plaintiff (Respondent), Fullmer Broth-
ers, in Civil No. 150734, Prudential Federal 8ari11gs & 
Loa.n Association v. Fullmer Brothers, et al. (R-71) 
The question of u:l1Pther Appellant, Pacific lndern.-
nity Compatny, is obligated to indemnify its ins11red 
(Fullmer) is not before the Court. 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, upon plain-
tiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, supported by the 
pleadings in this cas0 and the pleadings in Civil ~o. 
150734, Appellant's Insurance Policy No. LAC-120924, 
Affidavits, documentary evidc>nce and Memoranda of Au-
thorities, ruled: The Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Com-
pany, is liable to the plaintiff (Fullmer) for their com-
plete defense in Civil No. 150734 under its Comprehen-
sive Liability Policy No. LAC-120924, on the ground that 
the exclusionary provisions as related to the duty to 
defend is unclear and ambiguous; that the policy requires 
the insurer to defend even though the cause of action is 
''groundless, false or fraudulent,'' and that therefore 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment must be grant-
ed. (R. 210-212) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association 
(Owner) enter into a Cost-Plus-a-Fee Contract with Full-
mer Brothers (Plaintiff) (Defendant's Ex. D-1) to con-
struct the new Prudential Building at 115 South Main 
2 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Prudential required Fullmer to secure insurance to 
protect Fullmer in the event the building should "col-
lapse" (R-44, R-226), and (Defendant's Ex. D-1) and to 
provide aggregate property damage coverage with $500,-
000.00 limits. Coverage to be maintained in force for 365 
days after completion of job. Prudential and Fullmer sub-
mitted its insurance requirements for the construction 
of the Prudential Building to the Appellant, Pacific In-
demnity Company, through its agent, defendant, Fred A. 
l\foreton & Company. Both plaintiff, Fullmer, and 
Owner, Prudential, specified to Appellant, Pacific Indem-
11it~T Company: 
''The exclusion fom coverage of the policy de-
signed 'Explosion' (X), collapse (C) ... must he 
eliminated from the coverage of the policy (R-226. 
R-44, Appellant's Exhibit D-1, Page 5) ... and 
the Contractor shall maintain such insurance as 
will protect him ... from claims for damages to 
property - any and all of which may arise out of 
or result from Contractor's operations under this 
contract, whether such operations be by himself 
or by any subcontractor or any one directly or in-
directly employed by either of them. This insur-
ance shall be written for not less than any limits 
of liability specified as part of this contract. Cer-
tificates of such insurance shall be filed with the 
Owner and Architect." (Appellant's Exhibit D-1 
under General Conditions, Page 6.) 
Having received the inisurance specifications re-
quired for the construction of the Prudential Building, 
Pacific Indemnity Company then issued its broad form 
comprehensive liability policy No. LAC-120924 (R. 6). 
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Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Company, admits luw-
ing received these i11surance requirements for the Pru-
dential Building because it supported its opposition to 
plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment by offering in 
evidence defendant's Exhibit D-1, containing the identi-
cal insurance specifications of the Owner and Fullmer 
' as shown in R. 44 and 45. 
For reasons yet to be determined, defects were dis-
covered in the large 80-ton girders after they were <>rect-
ed and placed in the Prudential Building some 100 feet in 
the air. To mitigate damage to Prudential's propert~· 
and possible injury and loss of life, emergency measures 
were employed to prevent the building from collapsing. 
After tension on the large girders was released they 
were then repaired in the air at an alleged cost of $993,-
874.31, including $86,450.00 for loss of use. Prudential 
filed suit against plaintiff, Fullmer; Subcontractor, Allen 
Steel Company; and Architect, \Villiam Pereira & Asso-
ciates, praying for judgment against these defendants 
and asking for its costs and attorney's fees. This Ci,·il 
Action No. 150734 was filed June 25, 1964, in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, and has since been expanded 
to include as third-party defendants, United States Steel 
Corporation, Nels P. Mettome, d/b/a N. P. Mettome, 
Contractor, and George Brandow and Ray .Johnston, 
d/b/a Brandow and Johnston. (United States Steel Cor-
poration furnished the steel for the building; Mettome 
erected the steel; and, Brandow and Johnston were the 
engineers who designed the steel structure.) This case is 
awaiting trial in the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
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Fullmer Brothers tendered the defense of Civil No. 
150734 to Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Company. 
Pacific Indemnity Company, admits (1) having re-
ceived timely notice of damage to the new Prudential 
Building - the subject of the suit against its insured, 
Fullmer; (2) having received copies of Summons and 
Complaint and given an opportunity to defend its in-
sured, Fullmer; and, (3) having refused to defend its 
insured, Fullmer. (See paragraph 8 of Answer filed by 
Pacific Indemnity Company) (R. 26). 
Appellant, Pacific Indemnity Company, in its brief, 
Pages 3, 4 and 5, sets out only some of the allegations of 
Prudential's Complaint, obviously omitting Fullmer's 
Answer, denying these said allegations, and excluding 
the allegations of the various other parties to this civil 
action involving third party claims, counterclaims and 
cross-claims. 
Appellant, at Pages 6 and 7 of its brief, sets forth the 
Insuring Agreement of its policy and then proceeds to 
hypothecate a theory which absolves Appellant from any 
liability, predicated upon certain exclusionary clauses. 
Whether there is or is not liability to indemnify Fullmer, 
under the said policy is not at issue in the case before 
this Court. The only issue involved is strictly the duty 
to defend as determined from a reading of the policy. 
Appellant itself would undoubtedly concede that the 
present judgment should not be interpreted as an adjudi-
cation of the obligation to indemnify. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
FULLMER BROTHERS' MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT ON THE SINGLE ISSUE 
OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND THE PRUDEN-
TIAL CASE, CIVIL NO. 150734. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF , FULLMER 'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
GRANTED BECAUSE ONLY A QUESTION 
OF LAW WAS AT ISSUE. 
It is well settled that Summary Judgment is proper-
ly entered if there is no genuine issue of a material fact 
to be tried. There is no issue of a material fact in this 
case. See In re Williams' Estates, 10 U. (2d) 83, 348 P. 
2d 683 (1960), for a statement of the proper test. The 
only question submitted for decision was Appellant's 
duty to defend its insured, Fullmer, in Civil No. 150734. 
The definition and scope of Appellant's duty to defend 
can only be ascertained from the language of Compre-
hensive Liability Policy No. LAC-120924, issued by Ap-
pellant to cover Fullmer 's operations in the construction 
of the Prudential Building. Interpretation and meaning 
of an insurance contract, like any other contract, is a 
question of law for the Court. It is respectfully submitted 
therefore, that if the law is on plaintiff's side, no error 
was committed in granting plaintiff's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment. (R-188) 
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It is important to note again that the lower court did 
not determine, nor was the issue before the court what 
obligation, if any, Pacific Indemnity Company may ulti-
mately have to indemnify plaintiff in the event Prude11-
tial Federal Savings & Loan Association is successful in 
its suit against plaintiff, Fullmer. 
POINT II. 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY DOES 
NOT CLEARLY DEFINE THE APPLICA-
TION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE TO 
THE DUTY TO DEFEND. THIS AMBIGUITY 
MUST BE CONSTRUED TO FAVOR RE-
SPONDENT, FULLMER BROTHERS. 
It is a basic legal principle that in the interpretation 
of insurance contracts, all doubts as to meaning should 
be resolved in favor of the insured and that any exception 
to the insurer's performance of the basic underlying ob-
ligation, must be clearly and conspicuously stated so as 
to clearly appraise the insured of its effect. 
In a recent California Supreme Court case Gray v. 
Zurich, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P. 2d 168, 171 (1966) 
(full opinion at R-154-172) the insured filed a suit 
against the insurer for failure to def end an action 
brought by a third party against the insured. The third 
party complaint alleged the insured had committed an 
assault. The insurer premised its refusal to defend on 
an exclusionary clause which excused its defense of an 
action in which plaintiff alleged that the insured inten-
tionally caused bodily injury. Justice Tobriner speak-
ing for the Supreme Court said: 
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"Although Courts have long followed the ba-
sic preC'ept that they would look to the wordR of 
the contract to find the meaning which tlw parties 
expected from them - th0~r have also applied tlw 
doctrine of the adhesion contract to insurance 
policies, holding that in view of the disparate bar-
gaining status of the parties we must ascertain 
the meaning of the contract which the insured 
would reasonably expect." 
Likewise Dean Pound undertakes to provide the 
rationale for the rule in the Spirit of Common Law 
(1921) at page 29, he states that: 
"Taking no account of legislatiYe (i.e., no11-
common law) limitations upon freedom of con-
tract, in the purely judicial development of our 
law we have taken the law of insurance practically 
out of the category of contract, and we ha'lre 
established that the duties of public service com-
panies are not contractual, as the nineteenth cen-
tury sought to make them, hut are instead rela-
tional; they do not flow from agreements which 
the public servant may make as he chooses, they 
flow from the calling in which he has engaged and 
his consequent relation to the public.'' 
It appears that Courts for good reason are reluct-
ant to enforce the terms of an exclusionary provision 
against the insured unless the notice of noncoverage is 
conspicuous, plain and clear. 
Policies are prepared by the experts, they are highly 
technical in their phraseology and often are veritahle 
traps for the unwary. 
It remains to test the policy and its exclusionary pro-
vision in the instant case in light of the adhesion prin-
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ciple in order to determine ·whether Pacific Indemnity's 
refusal is justified. 
Under the insuring agreement, Pacific Indemnity 
undertook two primary obligations: (R. 6-R. 7) 
(1) "Coverage C - Property Damage Liabilit~' 
- except automobile. 
''To pay on behalf of the insured, all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of injury to or destruc-
tion of PROPERTY, including LOSS OF USE 
THEREOF, caused by accl.dent. (emphasis 
added) 
(2) "Defense, settlement, supplementary pay-
ments with respect to such insurance as is afford-
ed by this policy, the company shall: 
'' (a) Defend any suit against the insured, AL-
LEGING such injury ... or destruction and seek-
ing damages on account thereof, EVEN IF SUCH 
SUIT IS GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR FRAUD-
ULENT ... (emphasis added) 
"(h) (2) Pay all expenses incurred by the 
company, all costs taxed against the insured in 
any such suit, and all interest accruing after en-
try of the judgment until the company has paid 
or tendered or deposited in court such part of such 
judgment as does not exceed the limit of the com-
pany's liability thereon." 
The policy then provides for exclusions (a) through 
(k). (R. 7) Property Damage Amendment No. 6 (R. 16) 
provides that Exclusion (j) is replaced as follows: 
"(j) under coverage C(l) to injury to or de-
struction of property owned or occupied hy or 
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rented to the insured, (2) to injury to or destruc-
tion of any goods, products or containers thereof 
manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed or 
premises alienated by the named insured out of 
which the accident arises, (3) to injury to or de-
struction of property caused intentionally or 
knowingly by or at the direction of the named 
insured, ( 4) to injury to or destruction of prop-
erty, the restoration, repair or replacement of 
which has been made or is necessarv bv reason of 
faulty workmanship thereon by o~ 01; behalf of 
the insured, ( 5) to liability assumed by the in-
sured under any contract with respect to damage 
to property in the care, custody or control of the 
insured, unless the insured would have been le-
gally liable in the absence of such contract, ( 6) 
to injury to or destruction of property in the car0, 
custody or control of the insured for repair, stor-
age, sale or safekeeping or as bailee, trustee or 
agent or while being transported by or on behalf 
of the insured, (7) to injury to or destruction of 
property in the care, custody or control of the in-
sured which is to be installed, erected or used in 
construction by the insured, (8) to injury to or 
destruction of that particular part of any prop-
erty upon which operations are being performed 
by or on behalf of the insured at the time of the 
injury thereto or destruction thereof, arising out 
of such operations, or (9) to liability assumed by 
contract for penalties or liquidated damages aris-
ing out of an agreement to perform work or serv-
ices, or, the liability of the insured for breach of 
a contract, other than a warranty of goods or 
products as defined under sub-section (f) of con-
dition 3 of the policy." (See Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum R-134 to 139.) (Note also that nowhere are 
the words ''Contractor'' or ''Subcontractor'' 
mentioned in these exclusions.) 
10 
At the very outset it should be noted that the policy 
is entitled a Comprehensive Liability Policy, a designa-
tion which connotes general protection from alleged 
property damage. 
The Appellant then makes two promises: 
( 1) "To pay on behalf of the insured, all 
sums which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of injury to or 
destruction of property, and 
(2) "to defend any suit against the insured 
alleging such injury even if such suit is ground-
less, false or fraudulent.'' 
These promises, without further clarification certainly 
would lead Fullmer Brothers to expect Pacific Indemnity 
to def end it against suits seeking damages for injury and 
or destruction of property. Indeed, the broad language of 
these promises supports Fullmer's reasonable expecta-
tion that it purchased a legal defense for property dam-
age claims made against it regardless of the merit of such 
claims. 
If the Insurer wanted to condition its defense by 
saying what it now argues e. g. (that the duty to defend 
arises only if the insurer is bound to indemnify the in-
sured) it was free to so state when the policy was written. 
However, as pointed out in Gray v. Zurich, cited supra, 
this very contention creates a dilemma. 
''No one can determine whether the third 
party suit does or does not fall within the indem-
nification covering of the policy until the suit is 
resolved ... The carrier's obligation to indemnify 
inevitably will not be defined until the adjudica-
tion of the very action which it should have de-
J1 
fended. Hence the policy colltains its mYn seeds 
of uncertainty; the insurer has helcl out a promise 
that by its very nature is ambiguous .... The in-
sured is unhappily surrounded by concentric cir-
cles of uncertainty; the first, the unascertainable 
nature of the insurer's duty to defend; the second, 
the unknown effect of the provision that the in-
surer must defend even a groundless, false or 
fraudulent claim; the third, the uncertain extent 
of indemnification coverage .... " 
In the instant case, the determination of whether 
Fullmer Brothers is liable for an;- property damage must 
necessarily await final judgment in the Prudential action. 
Appellant could have used language calculated to clarif:-
the perimeter of its duty to defend. It has failed to do 
so. The omission clearly must be construed against the 
Appellant, Pacific Indemnit;-. :'.\foreover, the pertinent 
exclusionary clauses (j) (1) through (9) supra, are of no 
value in determining what the irnmrer undertook in terms 
of a promised defense. 
From a reading of these exclusions, no reference is 
found excluding defense and it is impossible to de-
termine what the Appellant intended to exclude from 
coverage. Did Pacific Indemnity Company intend 
to exclude property damage to the whole building 
including the nondefective parts or are the exclusions 
limited to that particular property subject to repair and 
restoration, e.g. the girders~ Appellant's attempt to 
extend these exclusions to include the whole building, in-
cluding the nondefective parts, on the theory that it is 
property upon which the Respondent worked. This is an 
unreasonable interpretation because in effect, it renders 
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the policy illusory insofar as any property damage tn 
the Prudential building is concerned. In any event, Ap-
pellant has failed to clarify the meaning of its exclusion-
ary clauses. The resultant ambiguity must be settled in 
fayor of Fullmer Brothers in vie'iv of the rule that am-
biguity in insurance contracts is resolved in light most 
fayorable to the insured. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE COURT ACCEPTS APPEL-
LANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE DUTY TO 
DEFEND ARISES ONLY IF CIVIL NO. 150734 
INVOLVES LIABILITY FOR WHICH THE 
INSURER, PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMP ANY, 
-WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INDEMNIFY 
THE INSURED, THE COURT MUST STILL 
FIND THAT APPELLANT IS AND WAS UN-
DER AN OBLIGATION TO DEFEND I~ CIV-
IL NO. 150734. 
Plaintiffs do not believe it necessary to burden this 
Court with extensive citation of authority for the well-
recognized rule of law that an insurer's duty to defend 
an action is measured in the first instance by the allega-
tions of the third party pleadings, and if such pleadings 
allege injury within the coverage of the policy, the in-
surer must def end irrespective of the insured 's ultimate 
liability to the third party. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. 
Continental Casitalty Co., 59 N.E. 2d 199 (1945), Osborne 
v. Security Insura1nce Co., 155 C.A. 2d 201, 318 P. 2d 94 
(1957). 
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In the case of Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty Com.pany, 
135 C.A. 2d 245, 286 P. 2d 1000 (1955 ), the court held: 
"Examination of the pleading reveals that it 
does factually allege an accident though it does 
not use the word. The draftsman of a complaint 
against the insured is not interested in the ques-
tion of coverage which later arises between in-
surer and insured. He chooses such theory as best 
serves his purpose; if it be breach of contract 
rather than negligent performance of contract, he 
chooses the former; if it be negligence rather than 
warranty he alleges negligence; if he happens to 
choose warranty it may be an express one or one 
implied. And when the question later arises un-
der an insurance policy as to what the facts al-
leged in the complaint do spell, for instance, 
whether they aver an accident - the complaint 
must be taken by its four corners and the facts 
arrayed in a complete pattern without regard to 
niceties of pleading or differentiation between 
different counts of a single complaint. And tlw 
ultimate question is whether the facts alleged do 
fairly apprise the insurer upon an occurrence 
which, if his allegations are true, give rise to lia-
bility of insurer under the terms of the policy 
... " (R-142) 
Later, in the case of Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 178 F. 2d 750 (1949) Chief Judge Learned Hand 
stated: 
" ... the injured party might conceivably re-
cover on a claim, which, as he had alleged it, was 
outside the policy; but which, as it turned out, the 
insurer was bound to pay. Such is the plasticit~· 
of modern pleading that no one can be posifrn' 
that that could not happen. In such a case, of 
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course, the insurer would not have to def end· yet 
ev.en then, as soon as, during the course of the 
trial, the changed character of the claim appeared, 
we need not say that the insured might not insist 
that the insurer take over the defense. When, 
however, as here, the comvlaint comvrehends an 
in.jury which may be toithin the POLICY, we hold 
that the vromise to defend includes it (emphasis 
ours) ... It follows that, if the plaintiff's com-
plaint against the insured alleged facts which 
would have supported a recovery covered by the 
policy, it was the dutv of the defendant to u~der­
take the defense until it could ronfine the claim 
to a recovery that the policy did not rover; ... " 
(R. 143) 
In accord: 
Greer-Robbins Co. v. Pacific Surety Co. 37 C.A. 
540 174 P. 110; 
Lamb v. Belt Casualty Co., 3 C.A. 2d 624, 40 P. 2d 
311; 
Remmer v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 140 C.A. 
2d 84, 295 P. 2d 19, 50 A.L.R. 2d 458, 466. 
In Karpe v. Great American Indemnity Co., 11 
Cal. Cal. Rptr. 908 (1961), the District Court of Ap-
peal acknowledged that the obligation to defend is indeed 
broader than the obligation to indemnify. Accordingly, 
it is not inconceivable that a carrier may be obligated to 
defend an action and yet at the same time be absolved 
from any responsibility to indemnify the insured against 
a judgment resulting therefrom. Thus, the absence of 
any evidence bearing upon a diminution in value of th>: 
structure may ultimately excuse the carrier from a duty 
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to indemnify. However, conjecture as to outcome or the 
evidence ·which may contribute thereto is no logical ba.,is 
upon which the duty to defend can be avoided. Clearly, 
the duty to defend Respondent exists irrespective of the 
uncertainty as to outcome at time of trial (R. 143) 
Prudential's Complaint against the insured alleged 
in substance that Prudential suffered $86,450.00 as dam-
ages because of loss of use of said building; that the two 
large girders erected in this unusual structure which 
were designed to support the floors in the building were 
defedive; and until repair and restoration could he 0f-
fected the entire structure suffered a diminution of value; 
and that collapse of the said lmilding was a real thr0at. 
(For a case involving threatened collapse See Morton v. 
Great American Insurance, 419 P. 2d 239, N.M. Oct.1966.) 
The exclusionary language contained in the polic:· 
und0r consideration does not undertake the deletion of 
any property damage resulting from loss of use, diminu-
tion in value or collapse. Moreover, any doubt as to 
whether Prudential's pleadings bring the occurrence 
within the terms of coverage must clearly be resoln~d i11 
favor of the insured, Fullmer Brothers. Likewise, when 
one of the grounds on which the action is based is "·ith-
in the policy, the obligation to defend comes to fruition 
Ritthie v. Anchor Casualty Co., supra.; 7 A A27plema11 
Insurance Law and Practice, Section 4683 (et seq). 
(R. 142.) 
In this same vein, not only is a carrier obligated to 
defend an action alleging a loss clearly within the terms 
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of the policy, but indeed the carrier is, and should lw, 
obligated to defend if there is, potentially, a case within 
the C'overage of the policy. Pow-Well Plumb,ing and JI cat 
v. Merchants Mutual Gas. Co., 89 N.Y.S. 2d 469 (1949) 
(cited with approval in Ritcher v. Anclzor Casualty Co., 
supra). William Blackfield, et al. v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd's of London, 53 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Sept. 1966). 
(R. 147) 
The exclusionary language does not undertake any-
where to delete property damage accruing from loss of 
use. Loss of use is specifically covered under Coverage 
C. supra, and is alleged as damage in Prudential's plead-
ings. Therefore, under the rule that the insurer's duty 
to def end is measured against the allegations of the third 
party complaint, Appellant is under an obligation to de-
fend Fullmer Brothers. Appellant was put on notice 
that Prudential was alleging property damage in the 
form of lost use. 
Likewise, the exclusionary language fails to exrlude 
diminution in the value of Prudential's building during 
the period of remedial care. The distinction between 
rlamages resulting from mere cost of repair and replace-
ment and damages represented by diminution in value of 
the building has clearly been recognized. 
In Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem-
nity Company, 51 C. 2d 558, 334 P. 2d 881, (1959), plain-
tiff, a home-builder, purchased 760 doors from a door 
manufacturer for installation in homes to be constructed 
by plaintiff. Thereafter, numerous defects appeared in 
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the doors. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer in the sum of 
One Hundred rrhousand Dollars ($100,000.00). In a pro-
ceeding subsequently commenced against the manufac-
turer's insurance carrier judgment was entered in faYor 
of plaintiff. The policy in issue was similar to Appel-
lant's LAC-120924 and provided as follows: 
''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become obligated to pay by 
reason of the liability imposed upon him by law 
or contract because of injury to or destruction of 
property, including the loss of use thereof, caused 
by accident.'' 
Under the exclusionary clause of the policy it pro-
vided that: 
"This policy does not apply ... 
( e) Under Coverage C, to injury to or destruction 
of .... 
(1) Any goods or products manufactured, sold, 
handled, or distributed by the insured or work 
completed by the insured out of which the accident 
arises.'' 
Further, the Exclusion of Products Liability pro-
vided: 
"It is agreed that the policy does not apply to: 
(1) The handling or use of, the existence of any 
condition in or a warranty of goods or products 
... sold ... by the named insured ... occurring 
after the insured has relinquished vossession 
thereof to others .... '' 
In disposing of the initial contention that no injrir~r 
to or destruction of property had been caused by acci-
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dent, Justice Traynor speaking for the Court, quoted 
with approval from Hauenstein v. St. Paul-Mercury In-
demnity Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W. 2d 122, 126: 
''Accident, as a source and cause of damage 
to property, within the terms of an accident pol-
icy, is an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned 
happening or consequence from either a known 
or unknown cause .... 
''The door failures were unexpected, unde-
signed and unforeseen. They were not the result 
of normal deterioration, hut occurred long hefore 
an;r properly construrted door might be expected 
to wear out or collapse ... it bears emphasis that 
we are concerned, not with a series of impercep-
tihle events that finally culminated in a single tan-
gible harm (cf., Ca;nadian Radium & Uranium 
Corp. v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 342 Ill. App. 
456, 97 N.E. 2d 132, 139-140), but with a series of 
specific events each of which manifested itself at 
an identifiable time and each of which caused iden-
tifiable harm at the time it occurred." 
In the course of distinguishing between damage to or 
destruction of the doors themselves as contrasted to any 
diminution in value of the houses as an element of prop-
erty damage, Justice Traynor stated: 
"It is not disputed that injury to or destruc-
tion of the doors themselves was excluded by ex-
clusion (e). Plaintiff contends, however, that 
both the houses and its business were damaged by 
the door failures. With respect to the houses its 
position is supported by Hauenstein v. St. Paul-
Mercury Indemnity Co., 242 Minn. 354 (65 N.W. 
2d 122. In that case the insured sold defective 
plaster that was used to plaster a house. The plas-
ter shrank and cracked to such an extent that it 
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was of no value and had to be removed so that the 
walls and ceilings could be replastered with a dif-
ferent material. Injury to the plaster itself was 
excluded from coverage. 'l1he Court held, how-
ever, that injury to the house had occurred and 
was covered under a clause identical ·with Cover-
age C in the present case. 'No one can reasonably 
contend that the application of a useless plaste.r 
which has to be remo,·ecl before the walls can be 
proper!:· replastered, does not lower the market 
value of a building. Although the injury to tlw 
walls and ceilings can be rectified by removal of 
the defective plaster, neYertheless, the presence 
of the defective plaster on the \Valls and ceilings 
reduced the value of the building and constituhd 
property damage. The measure of damages is the 
diminution in the market value of the building, or 
the cost of removing the defective plaster and re-
storing the building to its former condition, plus 
any loss from deprfral of use, whichever is the 
lesser.'' 
Again in commenting on the Hauenstein v. St. Paul-
Mercury Indemnity Co., supra, case Justice Traynor not-
ed that although the injury to the walls and ceilings 
could be remedied nevertheless the presence of the de-
fective plaster on the walls reduced the value of the 
houses. Similarly, in the present case, although the in-
jury to the building could be remedied, nevertheless, the 
presence of the defective girders reduced the value of 
the building and this diminution in value constitutes 
property damage. Again as noted in the Geddes opinion, 
the measure of damage is the diminution of the market 
value of the building or the cost of removing the def ec-
tive welds on the girders and replacing them plus the loss 
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of use of the building while the repairs are going on 
whichever is lesser. 
Close examination of the subject exclusionary clauses 
discloses no mention of the type of property damage 
known and described as "diminution of value," "loss of 
use," or "collapse." If it was the intention of the Ap-
pellant to exclude this type of property damage as con-
trasted to property damage solely represented by the 
cost of r<'pair or replacement, Appellant (Insurer) has 
failed to state such an exclusion. Appellant's failure in 
this regard must be resolved against it. 
Finally, we are not concerned so much with what 
occurrence or accident has taken place or what was re-
quired to correct it as we are with the types of damage 
allegedly suffered by Prudential. Thus it should be not-
ed that the cost of repairs as an item of damage exclud<>d 
under the policy can also constitute a measure of damage 
upon which an insured loss can be predicated. Admittedly 
the distinction is fine but just such a feather edge dis-
tinction was spelled out by .Justice Traynor in Geddes, 
supra. 
In the more recent case of Bundy the same distinc-
tion is set out. Bundy Tithing Co. v. Royal Indemnity 
ro., 298 Fed. 2d 151, 6th Circuit 1962. The insured in that 
ease commenced an action against his products liability 
insurer to recover the cost of settling and def ending cer-
tain claims against him because of failure of radiant 
heating tubing in buildings constructed by the insur<>d. 
Three lawsuits had been filed against the insured in 
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( 'alifornia awl fin• ill :\! iC'hil..'.'<111 H'Pking r<'('!>\·ery for 
dama~(·s to proJH'l°t.'> sustai11C'd h_,. J'(•ason of th0 <10fr<'ti\·p 
t11hi11g-, inst;illPd as part of th<• hPati11g- systf'ms. Th!' 
suits alk!!<>d lll'L'.'ligf'll<'(' in th<' marn1fad11rf' of th<' tuhi11~ 
or hrPa('h of ,,.a 1Tm1t>· or hot h as a rPs11lt of whid1 th" 
tubing failP<l a11<1 l<•ak<><l. Tht> appli<·ahlt' poliry pro,·i<1<·d 
for tht> 0xclusio11 of <111>· "i11.i11ri1 fn nr r/f'sfr11«fio11 or a11.11 
.r1nnrls or 11rnrl11ds 111a11ufacf11rrrl, solrl, hanrllrrl or rlis-
trilJl(fpr/ hy thr namrrl i11s11red or wnrk u1111plefrd 71.11 or 
for f],,, 11a111erl i11s11rerl out of ll'hich the orrirlr11t arisl's." 
(C'mphasis ours) The principal clamagP rlaimPd was fnr 
th<> eost of r0mo,·al of thP eo1wrPtC' flooring in whirh tht> 
dC'f Prti,·e tubing- had lwe>n imlwclcled a11<1 the> laying of 
110w rorn·rC'tP i11 whirh to plarP JH'\Y tubing. As to this 
the cle>fondm1t insuranre rarri<'r eontencled that the oH 
ronrretC' had Hot lw011 damag<'d in any arrident arn1 that 
m any en'11t liahilit~· was 0xelrnle>d un<lPr thr Pxrl11sin11 
rla11sC'. TllC' Sixth Cirrnit Court of AppC'als said: 
"In our opinio11, prope>rt>· was damaged h~· tlw 
i11stallation of defertin' tnhing in a ra(liant heat-
ing systl'm whirh ra11sC'<l the system to fail and 
h0romC' 11s0l0ss. A home>owner would np,·pr ha,·r 
surh equipment installPd if he knew that it would 
last only a n'ry short time>. ..\ home with a heat-
i11g system whirh did not fnnrtion wouhl •·Prtainly 
not ht• suitable for Ji,·ing qnarters in the wiutPr-
time. ThP mnrkl't for its sale would he Rerionsly 
afforted. 
"The failure of tlw tnhing- in the heat in~ ~.\·:.;­
tern in a relath·ely short time was unforesC'en, 1111-
0x1wrted and nnintPrnh•d. Damage to th0 nrop-
erty was tlwrefore cnn~er1 hy ar<'id0nt.'' 
c\ 11 <'H'll Il101'(' COlltC'mpornry C3S(' inYoJving the same' 
i;;:-;11(' is Ricliler n11111es, !111-. ,._ r·1ulerwrifers at !Jowl's, 
/,011rln11, 2:~8 Cal. App. 2d ;):12 (19h:J). (IIP1Hing- unani-
mously <lenied hy the Suprf'm<' Court of California, 
1966.) There the plaintiff, a home' huilder, was sued hy 
sen'ral home owners for damage's to their home's rC'sult-
ing from the rupture and failure' of thC'ir radiant heating 
s>·stems. The defendant, insurer, refusC'd to def end tlH'se 
third party suits on the ground that they were excluded 
nndC'r the terms of the policy. The rele,·ant exclusion 
stakd: "THIS CERTIFICATE DOES NOT COVER 
LIABILITY ... D - For claims made against the' as-
sured - (1) For repairing or replacing any defective 
product or products manufactured, sold or supplied hy 
the' assured or any defective part or parts thereof not for 
the cost of such repair or replacement or (2) For the 
loss of use of any such defeetive product ... (3) For 
damage to that particular part of any property upon 
whieh the assured is or has been working caused hy the 
faulty manner in which the work has been performed." 
After stating that it is not concerned with the obli-
gation to indemnify the court said: 
''The duty to defend is much broader than the duty 
to indemnify ... Where there is doubt as to whether the 
duty to defend exists, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the insured and t1gainst the insurer." (RitchiP 
, .. Anchor Casualty Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d. 245, 251 r286 
P. 2d 1000]; Firemen's Fuud ln.~urance Cn. v. Cha.~son, 
207 Cal. App. 2d 801, 805 (24 Cal. Rptr. 276] ). 
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Justice Salsman goes on to state the rule that the 
obligation to defend is measured by the pleadings and 
then states : 
[ 4a] The 21 plaintiffs who joined in the Mann 
complaint each alleged that because of the negli-
gently installed radiant heating system the mar-
ket value of his home had been or would be im-
paired. This is an allegation of damage entireh· 
unrelated to damage resulting from the cost of r~­
pairs and replacement of the defective heating 
system and hence is a claim for a loss or damage 
covered by the insurance. [5] That diminution 
in the market value of the claimants' homes be-
cause of the presence of the defective radiaoit heat-
ing system would be a proper measure of dam-
ages is supported by Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. 
P(};Ul Mercury Indemnity Co., 51 Cal.2d 558, 565 
[334 P.2d 881], where the court quoted at length 
and with approval from the case of Hauenstein v. 
Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354 [65 
N.W.2d 122]. In Hauenstein, defective plaster 
had been applied to a building. The court noted 
that the presence of the defective plaster on the 
walls of the building constituted property dam-
age, and declared: ''The measure of damages is 
the diminution in the market value of the building, 
or the cost of removing the defective plaster and 
restoring the building to its former condition plus 
any loss from deprival of use, whichever is the les-
ser." The plaintiffs named in the Mann complaint 
also alleged damage to real property, improve-
ments, appliances and furnishings. These are 
clearly claims for damages that are separate and 
distinct from any claim based upon the cost of re-
pair or replacement of the defective heating sys-
tem itself. Such claims are clearly within the co>·-
erage of appellant's policies. 
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[ 4b] In like manner, each of the other com-
plaints contains some allegation of damages un-
related to the cost of repair and replacement of 
the defective heating system. Thus, some claim 
structural damage to their houses, while others 
allege a decrease in the value of their homes, or 
claim damage to furniture, fixtures and appli-
ances. All of these claims appear to come within 
the coverage extended by the insurance and hence 
the duty to defend is present. (Remmer v. Glens 
Falls Indem. Co., supra, 140 Cal.App.2d 84; see 
also Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 178 F.2d 
750.) (Emphasis supplied) 
(See full opinion of Eichler case at R. 96 et seq.) See 
also Lowell v. Maryland Casualty, 419 P. 2d 180, Califor-
nia 1966. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the only question 
before the lower court involved interpretation of an in-
surance contract (the duty to defend) and was, therefore, 
ripe for summary judgment; that the policy is ambig-
uous and uncertain and must be construed to favor Re-
spondent; that Prudential's complaint alleged property 
damage outside the exclusionary provisions of the pol-
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icy and thus impels a defense by insurer; that the duty 
to defend is greater than the duty to indemnify; that 
"loss of use," "diminution of value" and "collapse" 
were ·within the insuring agreements of the policy and not 
excluded and therefore, the ruling of the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
By ALLAN E. MECHAM 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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